Trade History


Quote from John Hussman on Monday:

Many investment professionals have developed a habit of forming expectations based on nothing more than extrapolation of short-term trends in the data, even when those extrapolations are inconsistent with market history or well-established economic relationships.

Quote from Laszlo Birinyi on Thursday:

If the market is continually picking black, picking red is not necessarily a good idea.

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I’m bearish on the stock market because I believe the US economy has the potential to encounter hardships in the near future, and valuations are too high.  Even though some advisors continue to play the momentum game (Birinyi above), I would like to believe that a little a leg work will be rewarded.

To execute this line of thinking, I sold three bull put spreads on SDS (-33+26 Sep10).  SDS performs 2x the daily direction of the S&P 500.  Since I believe that the S&P 500 will go down, SDS would then go up.

Dissecting the put spread

Sold SDS 33 Sep10 P @ $4.22

Bought SDS 26 Sep10 P @ $0.74

Possible outcomes:

  • If the market falls only slightly by September, SDS will close at $33 or higher.  In this case, both options would expire worthless, and I would then keep the proceeds of today’s trade:  $1,028.97.  This is the difference between the sale of the $33 strike option ($4.22) and the purchase of the $26 strike option ($0.74) minus a commission.  (Remember that each option is worth 100 shares, and I sold 3 option contracts; $3.48*100*3-$15.03 = $1,028.97).  Even if the market tanks and SDS significantly increases, my maximum gain is $1,028.97.
  • Perhaps my thesis is wrong (the trade moves completely against me), and SDS falls below $26 in September.  I now owe the difference between the $33 strike that I sold and the $26 strike that I purchased ($700 for each spread, meaning a total of $2,100).  The $2,100 loss would be offset by the $1,028.07 already in hand, so my maximum loss is $1,071.93.
  • Now, let’s say that SDS ends up somewhere in between $26 and $33.  I could win or lose depending on where it ends up.  My Breakeven point is $33 – $3.48 = $29.52.  Now add a fraction to account for commissions to make the breakeven $29.57.  So above $29.57 I make money, below $29.57 I lose money.

My broker failed to maintain adequate inventory of ITB shares today, so I was forced to cover my ITB short position by 200 shares, at $13.84.  I replenished this position by purchasing three ITB 17.50 Jul10 Put options at $3.90; these are options that I have purchased before.  Even though I am down somewhat significantly on this trade, I remain steadfast that housing is overvalued, as evidenced by my continued financial backing.

I admit, there is still some uncertainty to this trade, but I bought copper today.  Here is my thesis…

An 8.8 magnitude earthquake bellowed Chile on Saturday.  The magnitude was about 500 times that of the first quake in Haiti, yet might have less damaging effects as it was located offshore and deeper in the ground.  Emergency crews are still swirling around cities, and from what I’ve gathered, looting has not been contained.  The focus of Chile’s citizens is focused on the basics–food, water, and safety.  In some areas, many are sleeping in the streets for fear that their structures will collapse; this problem has the potential to be amplified if aftershocks occur.

The economic impact is potentially global in nature.  Chile is the world’s largest copper producer, accounting for 1/3 of the world’s output.  Reasonably thinking, one can imagine that when the supply of copper is reduced, the price will rise.  Now, some copper mines have and will reopen, but impasses still remain.  Some mines are closed due to power outages, and highways to transport copper are impaired.  Besides, if I am Chilean citizen, I’m more worried about ensuring my safety more than exporting copper.

map of region

(image from BBC news)

Pricing this trade was an issue.  I read reports of copper prices soaring 5-8% on the news.  However, JJC, the Copper ETN, was only up about 2% at the open and stayed relatively stable throughout the day.  Obviously an investor would want to own the commodity before a supply shock.  Here, I’m betting on continued chaos, power/transport impairments, or aftershocks.

From an allocation perspective, I have been eager to add commodity exposure since I’m a little light in that area.  As for JJC, I owned (and sold) it years ago, but am always cautious with an exchange traded note.  The trade:  Bought 30 shares of JJC at $45.70.

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Last night I published an introductory piece on how options work.  It is written for the novice stock trader.  Feel free to take a look.

A decline in housing remains one of my strongest investment ideas.  Let’s walk through the thought process…

Congress is subsidizing housing demand via its first-time homebuyer tax credit.  This pulls forward future demand.  When the program ends, demand starts to dwindle (and will fall to an even lower amount than what normally would have occured).  If Congress extends this subsidy, which happened last fall, even more demand will be pulled forward, and the fall will be even greater.  This ongoing game of taxing people to subsidize home ownership has consequences as demand cannot be artificially inflated forever.  Housing demand will decline.

A simple rule of economics:  when demand declines, prices fall.

 The second part of the equation is the onslaught of delinquencies and foreclosures coming onto the market.  Reasonably thinking, with an enormous amount of houses soon to be available for sale, constructing even more houses is not a good business to be in.

Another simple rule of economics:  when supply increases, prices fall.

The trade:  bought 2 ITB July put options at strike $17.50, for $4.50 each.  The breakeven is about $13, and the stock closed at $13.25 today.  (I made a very similar trade last month).

I had an old short straddle on Merck (MRK) that I bought to cover today.  These were converted options (I originally sold the short straddle on Schering-Plough which subsequently became MRK options).  As such my broker’s software didn’t properly recognize them (crazy in this day in age).  The result was that I had to phone in every trade that I wanted to make.  So, I decided to rid the position (although I still retain the underlying 57 MRK shares).

Simultaneously, I had an order in to purchase more put options on ITB.  The theory was long MRK and short ITB.  However, the ITB trade never went through.  Hopefully I can increase my ITB put exposure in the near future.

I purchased 12 put contracts on Freddie Mac (FRE), with a strike price of $1 and expiration of July, for $0.16 each.

The thesis was brought to my attention by John Hussman in his November 16 weekly column where he quotes Freddie Mac’s quarterly report:

“In June 2009, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an amendment to the accounting standards for transfers of financial assets (SFAS 166) and an amendment to the accounting standards on consolidation of variable interest entities (SFAS 167). Both amendments are effective and will be applied prospectively by the company on January 1, 2010 … Under these accounting standards, the company will record the underlying mortgage loans in these single-family PC trusts and some of its Structured Transactions on its balance sheet. These mortgage loans have an outstanding unpaid principal balance of approximately $1.8 trillion as of September 30, 2009… While Freddie Mac continues to evaluate the impacts of adoption, the company expects that the adoption could have a significant negative impact on its net worth.”

Fundamentally, I still believe that this economy has problems ahead.  Moreover, even if the economy was in decent shape, the market is still overvalued.  With a probable second round of foreclosures upcoming, the FASB amendment could be a nice catalyst for a larger trend, at least for FRE.  As for the execution, I’m well willing to risk $200 on this.

I know who it is before I even answer the phone.  At 9:40AM, the market has just opened, and I already know that at least one of my short positions has been covered…

“Hello?”

“Hi… this is [broker] calling to inform you that there was an SEC mandated forced buy of 1 share of CYN from you account…”

Seriously!  Seriously?  1 share?  You’re going to pawn me off one share so that my position is now 49 shares?  Who will want me to buy 49 shares from them?  Yuck.

So my 1 share was bought at $49.85.  I decided to cover the entire position later in the day at $49.55.  Seeing my thesis erode, I would liked to have covered in the high $40s, perhaps a dollar or so lower.  In review, the FDIC-Imperial deal to CYN was clearly a blow to my short position; the deal was instantly accretive to City National’s book value.  Further, I now recognize that I may not have had the right stock for the play–I wanted to profit from a fall in California banks, thinking all would suffer (which still might happen).  However, even though CYN is in a losing region, it is probably the best of a bad lot.  Whether or not this thesis eventually plays out is no longer worth my coin.  At this point, I take the loss and move on.

From a portfolio perspective, I wanted to keep a similar amount of negative exposure to replace the covering of CYN.  So, I purchased two put options on SSO (the double levered S&P500 ETF).  These were the June $44 contracts, at $8.00 each.

Even in a loss, I still keep score:

3-Aug CYN short 40 40.66  $   1,619.35
18-Nov CYN dividend 40 0.1  $        (4.00)
20-Nov CYN bought to cover 40 37.45  $  (1,505.00)
18-Dec CYN short 50 41.22  $   2,053.94
2-Feb CYN bought to cover 1  49.85  $       (56.85)
2-Feb CYN bought to cover 49  49.55  $  (2,434.98)
           $     (327.54)

 I initiated a new long position today: 30 shares of Exelon Corporation (EXC) at $46.14.  Exelon is (I believe) America’s largest utility company; it’s primary markets are Chicago (ComEd) and Philadelphia (PECO).  Being a utility company, some of you may view this as a rather bland play, and to some degree, it is.  However I see this as an appropriate tactical maneuver in a strategy that allows for an open minded approach to investment success.

This story begins late last year.  In December, Bill Gross (of PIMCO) opined in favor of purchasing utility stocks.  His argument is that over the next several years, “Diminished growth, deleveraging, and increased government involvement will temper profits and their eventual distribution to investors.”  In such an environment, utility stocks will adequately perform.  I agree.

In last week’s issue of Forbes, Exelon was named one of America’s Best Companies (only three were highlighted).  The article mentioned that Exelon runs 17 nuclear reactors, “by far the largest nuclear fleet in the nation and the third biggest in the world.”  With its nuclear advantage, Exelon can produce low cost, carbon free energy, something that other utilities cannot do.  “Exelon’s nukes turn out 130 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity every year and not a single metric ton of carbon dioxide.”  In my view, Exelon is a company that will be able to generate solid returns without having to worry about competition.

Since I belive that Exelon will be an overachiever for years, all I needed was a reasonable entry point for the stock.  Since Gross’s article was published, utility stocks and the market have been slightly positive, whereas Exelon has fallen about 4%.  I’m happier to buy the dip now, than to have chased earlier only to watch the stock fall.

The remaining question is, why has Exelon underperformed recently?  Perhaps an unlikely passage of a cap-and-trade bill hurt the stock.  Such legislation would have hindered carbon producing utilities, but not Exelon.  Another explanation could be that investors and analysts were disappointed with Exelon’s earnings on Friday.  To me, this can be disregarded since the fundamental earnings power of Exelon are unchanged over the upcoming years.

Pricecheck!

In contrast to some other utility companies’ price metrics (as I calculate), Exelon’s metrics look fairly consistent and stable.  Cash return, return on invested capital, and earnings’ returns all tell similar stories even though they use different inputs.  A juicy dividend every quarter is also reassuring.

Stock Div% Cash return ROIC Earn% EBIT%
EXC 4.6% 8.7% 7.1% 8.3% 11.1%
           
WR 5.6% -4.3% 4.4% 8.0% 7.1%
NGG 5.6% 3.8% 9.4% 8.2% 10.3%
SO 5.3% -2.6% 5.3% 7.4% 7.4%
NST 4.5% 6.9% 6.1% 7.0% 9.0%
           
NRG 0.0% 12.1% 8.7% 12.3% 36.0%
AYE 2.7% -4.9% 5.4% 12.5% 9.4%
MIR 0.0% 1.1% 24.5% 11.5% 28.4%
ETR 3.8% 8.7% 4.9% 8.7% 8.3%
PEG 4.2% 1.4% 8.4% 10.2% 13.4%
AEP 4.6% -3.1% 5.2% 8.6% 8.6%

I sold my position of Chesapeake Natural Gas (CHK) today.  My orignal thesis is no longer valid, and the stock is probably fairly valued.  The main fear is that the supply of natural gas will become (or already is) excessive relative to the demand for natural gas.  This would move the price of natural gas lower, which would hamper producers like CHK.

Previously, I had written a call option (covered call position) that expired last Friday, and I considered writing another call.  However, I view the risk of principal loss as too great and am happy to walk away with a profit.  Further, since I held this position for a year, this gain is taxed at a long term capital gains rate.

Having sold CHK, I still desire a broad exposure to commodities.  Even though commodities have risen, and are likely to pull back, I purchased the Deutsche Bank Commodity Index (DBC), 50 shares at $24.50.    This purchase uses less than half of my funds from CHK, and I intend to increase my allocation to commodities on price weakness.

Taking the two trades together, I am now less exposed to natural gas and more broadly exposed to commodities.  I have less money on the table and am in position to increase my stake on price weakness.

Here is my history for CHK.  As you can see, I stumbled out of the gate on this, but catching the bottom and writing two covered call positions turned out to be great tactical manuevers.

9/15/2008 CHK bought 40 39.45 -1585
10/15/2008 CHK dividend 40 0.075 3
1/15/2009 CHK dividend 40 0.075 3
1/15/2009 CHK bought 60 14.38 -869.8
4/15/2009 CHK dividend 100 0.075 7.5
5/4/2009 CHK write call July $25 1 1.1 101.74
7/15/2009 CHK dividend 100 0.075 7.5
9/10/2009 CHK write call Jan $28 1 1.5 141.74
10/15/2009 CHK dividend 100 0.075 7.5
1/15/2010 CHK dividend 100 0.075 7.5
1/19/2010 CHK sold 100 28.20 2812.96
          637.64

I have been bearish on housing for about a year now.  Evidence of this can be seen here, when I first shorted ITB (betting against US Homebuilders) back on Feb 6, 2009.  I remain bearish on homebuilder stocks because I am skeptical of an economic recovery, question the supply/demand of the market, and believe valuations are expensive.  Let’s take these one at a time.

I hesisitate to believe a bounce-back economy is upon us.  The all-inclusive unemployment is 17.3%.  Even worse, manufacturing jobs are slipping while service jobs, like government positions are holding steady.  Further, with the decline in credit, I can’t imagine many companies are expanding their capacity to produce (via more factories/machines).  With fewer manufacturing jobs and without investments in production capabilities, how can an economy produce more to enable a recovery?  I have read that even if the data somehow shows a recovery, it will be not only a jobless recovery, but a job-loss recovery.

To get a sense on how unemployment affects the housing outlook, consider this from Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Economy.com:

A soft job market, especially one this soft, means potential buyers don’t have money to pour into new homes or the confidence that they’ll be able to hang on to their jobs and pay the mortgage on their existing home.

Combine the weak consumer with massive mortgage rate resets (most of which are unlikely to have been modified), and it’s easy to see that supply is likely to outstrip demand.  Reasonably thinking, if consumers are unable and unwilling to purchase houses, homebuilders will have difficulty profiting from not selling houses.

To further strengthen my argument, Pending Home Sales increased in response to the government’s tax credit for first time homebuyers through October.  Then, when the tax credit was originally set to expire in November, Pending Home Sales dropped.  Now that the tax credit has been extended to April, prices have again mitigated.  This means that the deciding factor in home sales has been the tax credit.  All this is doing is pulling forward demand.  May I kindly remind the audience what happened to car sales following the end of the cash-for-clunkers program:  demand dropped to below where it had been before the program started.  I believe that since the tax credit has existed for a longer duration, the drop in home sales will be more severe.

CashForClunkersGraph

On to valuation… Yahoo shows the P/E of ITB at 23.7; given my thoughts above, I think this is absurdly high.  Perhaps earnings are depressed, which could warrant a high multiple.  However,  I argue that earnings will continue to be depressed, at least through the first half of 2010.

As far as execution goes, I would have liked to have shorted an additional 100 shares of ITB, but there were none left to borrow at my brokerage.  So, I purchased 3 put contracts at the July $17.50 strike, for $4.70 each.  Considering ITB is trading at about $13 per share, I am quite content with a $12.80 break-even price.  I’m hardly paying a premium–only paying $0.20 for six months of time decay.  (For the options gurus, the volatility was 30, which is what I consider an inexpensive option contract).

A final note…  One of the neat things about trading options that are deep-in-the-money is that sometimes you can see your volume.  If you look up the .ITBSW option, you can see three contracts traded today; those would be mine.  I have displayed this below in the red circle.  To the left of it, you can also see the $4.70 that I paid for each of them.

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